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Abstract
We study the problem of an inventor who brings to the market an innovation that
can be legally copied. Imitators may ‘enter’ the market by copying the innovation at a
cost or by buying from the inventor the knowledge necessary to reproduce and use the
invention. The possibility of contracting affects the need for patent protection. Our
results reveal that: (i) Imitators wait to enter the market and the inventor becomes
a temporary monopolist; (ii) The inventor offers contracts which allow resale of the
knowledge acquired by the imitators; (iii) As the pool of potential imitators grows
large, the inventor may become a permanent monopolist.
JEL: L24, O31, O34, D23, C73.
Keywords: Patents, contracting, knowledge trading, delay, war of attrition.
1. Introduction
The economics of innovation revolve around the design and analysis of incentive schemes
for inventors under the threat of imitation. The main premise is that, when knowledge is
cheap to imitate, innovative rewards are vulnerable to ex-post expropriation by imitators.
Imitators immediately copy the innovation, dissipating the rents of inventors and thus dis-
couraging costly research. This reasoning justifies the need for patents and other legal means
of protecting the inventors’ profits.
Controversies, however, about the strength of intellectual property rights, the set of
technologies that should be protected by intellectual property law and even the need for
such a system have been recurrent over time. The essence of these debates is expressed in
the following question raised by Gallini and Scotchmer (2001):
∗Department of Economics, London Business School, London NW1 4SA, England; and Departmento de
Economia, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Madrid 126, 28903 Getafe, Spain, respectively.
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Are there natural market forces that protect inventors so that formal protections or other
incentives are not necessary?1
This paper answers this question by providing theoretical foundations for a natural, intu-
itive and market-based mechanism which yields substantive rents for inventors in the absence
of patent protection. Specifically, we reveal that the possibility of trading the knowledge
which is necessary to develop and use the innovation fundamentally alters the ‘conventional
wisdom’ on the need for patent protection.
This natural market force is based on the dynamic trading of knowledge. As a preview of
our main results, we note that, in equilibrium, potential imitators will ‘imitate’ the innova-
tion by buying knowledge rather than by spending duplicative resources. Furthermore, the
inventor offers to sell knowledge through contracts which allow subsequent reselling by the
buyers. Thus, the first buyer will compete with the inventor to sell his acquired knowledge to
the remaining imitators. Therefore, initially, imitators have an incentive to delay their entry
with the hope that some of their rivals will trade with the inventor before them, anticipating
as a consequence a future reduction in the price of knowledge. Temporarily the inventor
becomes a monopolist and might receive a reward arbitrarily close to monopoly profits, even
for relatively small imitation costs.
Thus this paper suggests that the lack of appropriability typically associated with inven-
tions holds only under important restrictions about trading opportunities between inventors
and imitators. Whereas the previous literature has focused on the profits after imitation
(i.e., ex-post profits) as the main determinant of the inventors’ payoff, we underline that the
payoff received by inventors is determined by: (i) The difference between the ex-post profits
and the imitation cost in an economy with a small number of potential imitators; and: (ii)
By the limiting ratio between the ex-post profits and the imitation cost in an economy with
a large number of potential imitators.
Discussion of Main Results
We examine the following environment. Potential imitators may legally copy an innova-
tion at a certain imitation cost.2 Copying is profitable: Even if all potential imitators copy,
the equilibrium market profits which they collect are sufficient to cover the imitation cost.
Within the limits of this problem, our point of departure is to consider the dynamic trade of
knowledge between the inventor and potential imitators. Knowledge may be traded through
contracts in two distinct situations. First, the inventor, under the threat of profitable imi-
tation, may sell to the imitators the knowledge sufficient for them to reproduce and use the
1(pp. 52; italics added)
2The cost of reverse engineering the product which can be very small.
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invention. Second, those imitators who initially bought knowledge from the inventor might
also subsequently resell it to the remaining imitators.
Let us emphasize that the knowledge contracts we refer to are different from traditional
licensing contracts that are familiar to us in our world with patents.3 Knowledge contracts
are an engagement to transfer the knowledge necessary to develop and use the innovation in
exchange for a fee. A buyer of such a contract thus saves the cost of reverse engineering the
product. Licensing contracts, on the contrary, rely on patents: They grant the buyer the
right to use the patented innovation. Note nevertheless that licensing contracts are often
accompanied by know-how transfer clauses where the seller takes for instance the engagement
of training the buyer’s employees.4 Furthermore, there is evidence, reviewed in section 6,
that pure know-how contracts unrelated to patents, are growing in importance.
The elements previously discussed are initially captured in a model with one inventor
and two potential imitators. Its extensive form is as follows. Time is divided into an infinite
sequence of periods. The innovation is introduced into the market at period zero. In each
period, imitators can ‘enter’ the market (start using the innovation) either by imitating at
a commonly known imitation cost or by buying knowledge (through a knowledge contract)
from the inventor. If, at any period, only one of the potential imitators has entered the
market, he might then compete in subsequent periods with the inventor to sell knowledge to
the remaining imitator.5
As a benchmark result, we establish that, when knowledge cannot be traded, both imita-
tors enter the market immediately, at period zero, by copying the innovation. By contrast,
our main result reveals that, when knowledge can be traded, potential imitators wait before
entering the market. Thus, the inventor becomes a temporary monopolist even in the absence
of patent protection.
The intuition for this result lies in the dynamics of the equilibrium price of knowledge.
The inventor initially offers knowledge for sale, through two transferable contracts, at a
posted price equal to the imitation cost. The contracts are called transferable because the
buyer may then resell his acquired knowledge to the remaining imitator without any restric-
tion. So, once an imitator enters the market by buying knowledge, through what we call
the first contract, he subsequently competes with the inventor on the ‘knowledge market’.6
3Note that the lack of patent protection is not an obstacle to sell knowledge in our environment. It has
been argued, in a different framework, that when buyers cannot assess the value of an idea they may be
reluctant to sign contracts (See Anton and Yao (1994)). In our environment, however, the innovation is
already on the market, success is publicly observable and these concerns can be safely ignored.
4Arora et al (2002) state that ‘over two thirds of a sample of UK firms reported that most or all of their
licensing agreements had know-how provisions’
5With simultaneous entry, the game ends.
6For the sake of simplicity we call the knowledge market the set of all potential or actual trades or
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In the unique (symmetric) Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE), after the first knowledge
contract is sold, the sellers immediately sell knowledge, through the second contract, to the
remaining imitator at a price equal to its marginal cost: zero.7 These dynamics in the price
of knowledge ensure an equilibrium payoff for the second entrant strictly higher than the
equilibrium payoff for the first entrant. Thus, each potential imitator waits a random amount
of time before entering the market with the hope that his rival will enter before him and
thus trigger competition in the knowledge market sufficient to decrease its price to zero.
Two features of this market mechanism are remarkable. First, even though the inventor
could offer contracts forbidding resale, she strictly prefers not to do so. If the inventor
offered such non-transferable knowledge contracts, potential imitators would realize that the
price of knowledge would not fall in the future and hence they would immediately enter to
avoid sacrificing current market profits. The inventor would collect twice the contract fee
but her market profits would immediately be reduced to triopoly rents. We show that the
expected length of monopoly time when transferable contracts are offered is sufficiently long
to dominate lost contract revenues. Thus, the transferability clause acts as a commitment
tool that provides credibility to the future price reductions of knowledge.
The second remarkable feature is revealed by a simple formula that we obtain for the equi-
librium payoff of the inventor. This expression uncovers that the inventor’s payoff is strictly
increasing in the level of the imitation cost. Moreover, the expected length of monopoly
time may be considerable, even when the imitation cost is small. For instance, suppose that
the imitation cost is small and close to, but smaller than, the present value of triopoly prof-
its. Then if knowledge trades were not feasible the inventor would receive the present value
of triopoly profits, a potentially very small amount. However, when knowledge is traded,
the expected length of monopoly time goes to infinity and the inventor receives a payoff
arbitrarily close to the present value of monopoly profits.
We also examine two further issues. First, we extend our model to an arbitrary number of
potential imitators. We show that, under some conditions, as the number of potential imita-
tors increases, the equilibrium reward of the inventor becomes arbitrarily close to monopoly
profits. Last, we contrast the predictions of the MPE with those of Subgame Perfect Equi-
librium (SPE). We show that a condition on market profits is necessary and sufficient for
the MPE to be the unique SPE. If this condition is not satisfied, multiple equilibria exist.
In some, entry might take place immediately and an appropriation failure might reappear.
However, it is not a consequence of the lack of intellectual property rights per se but rather
a problem caused by a slow diffusion of knowledge.
transactions in which knowledge is involved.
7The cost of transferring knowledge is normalized to zero.
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Although the prevalence of patents in most industrial sectors in developed countries
makes it difficult to find evidence of the use of this market mechanism in practice, anecdotal
evidence from countries in which patent protection is weak or non-existent fits well with
our results. We describe (see Section 6) how a mechanism surprisingly similar to ours can
explain the observed behavior in the market for generic drugs in India. We also provide more
systematic suggestive evidence. Further empirical work on this topic is undoubtedly needed
and our work can provide a suitable theoretical framework to conduct it.
Organization of this Paper
In Section 2 we describe the model. In section 3, we present our main findings. We show
how our mechanism leads to a natural protection for inventors and discuss the importance of
transferable knowledge contracts. In Section 4 we extend our model to an arbitrary number
of potential imitators. Section 5 discusses uniqueness and contrasts the predictions of MPE
with those of SPE. Section 6 presents suggestive evidence and section 7 discusses the related
literature. Finally, section 8 concludes. All proofs are presented in the Appendix.
2. The Model
An inventor (‘she’), denoted by s, has developed an innovation (process or product) that
is not legally protected against imitation. Two imitators, indexed by g ∈ {j, l}, may ‘adopt’
the innovation by either: (i) Using a costly imitation technology (henceforth, imitating); or
by: (ii) Buying knowledge from the inventor.
Time is broken into a countable infinite sequence of periods of length ∆ > 0. Each period
is indexed by t (t = 0, 1...). The innovation is introduced into the product market at period
zero. At that period, the imitators might already be producing in the market. Their profits
if they do not use the innovation are normalized to zero.8
The following terminology will be used throughout the paper. When an imitator adopts
the innovation at period t, we say that he enters the market regardless of his mode of entry.
Also we describe him as active in the market from that period on. The inventor and each
active imitator obtain the same equilibrium profit flow independently of how the imitators
entered. The profit flow received by each individual firm when n − 1 other firms are also
active is denoted by pin.
9
All parties are risk neutral and maximize the sum of their expected discounted payoffs
(profits plus potential contract payments). Agents discount the future exponentially with a
8This is without loss of generality. The model can encompass either a drastic or non-drastic innovation.
9To make our arguments most general profits are specified in reduced form.
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per-period discount factor equal to δ ≡ e−r∆, where r > 0 is the discount rate.10 So, the
profits received by each individual firm during a period in which n − 1 other firms are also
active is
∫ ∆
0
pine
−rtdt = (1− δ) Πn; where Πn ≡ r−1pin is the present value of market profits
per firm when n firms are active. We assume that profits satisfy the following standard
condition.
Assumption 0: Π1 > 2Π2 > 3Π3
An imitator by spending, at any period t, an amount of resources κ > 0 obtains instan-
taneously (at the same period) a perfect version of the innovation. We view κ as a one-time
sunk cost that must be incurred to reverse engineer the fine details of the innovation. An al-
ternative to imitation is to enter the market by buying knowledge through contracting. The
inventor, being the creator of the innovation, possesses the required (indivisible) knowledge
to transfer the innovation. If an imitator buys this piece of knowledge at t, he will be able
to instantaneously obtain a perfect version of the innovation at zero added cost.11
Contracting takes place as follows. At any t, before entry, a fix-fee contract between the
inventor (seller) and imitator g (buyer) is a pair (ptsg, θ
t
sg) ∈ [0,∞]× {0, 1}.12 ptsg ≥ 0 is the
price at which the inventor offers a contract of type θtsg to imitator g at t. Two types of
contracts can be offered: Non-transferable, θsg = 0, and transferable contracts θsg = 1. A
transferable contract allows an imitator to resell the knowledge acquired from the inventor
to the other imitator in subsequent periods. The following convention is adopted: Offering
no contract to imitator g, at period t, is equivalent to offering a contract at ptsg =∞. Last,
we also assume that if an imitator enters by imitating, he will also become a competitor of
the inventor in the knowledge market.13 Specifically, at each t, in which only one imitator,
say j, is active in the market and entered either by imitation or by buying a transferable
contract, he and the innovator offer a contract at a price ptjl and p
t
sl to imitator l respectively.
Potential knowledge exchanges occur within the framework of the following extensive
form game. Consider any period t in which no imitator has entered yet. Then:
(i) The inventor announces, on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, a pair of contracts,
{
ptsg, θ
t
sg
}
for g ∈ {j, l}. Then:
(ii) The imitators simultaneously decide whether to enter the market -either by imitating,
ig, or by buying knowledge through contracting, cg- or not to enter, wg.
10Note that when ∆→ 0, our model converges to a continuous time model with impatient decision makers.
11Transferring knowledge has no real cost.
12A previous version of the paper showed that the main results remain the same if we allow for two part
tariffs and linear demand but at the expense of simplicity.
13This assumption considerably simplifies many of our proofs and the number of continuation games that
need to be considered.
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The game continues in this manner as long as no imitator enters the market. If, at period
t, both imitators enter, the game formally ends and all players collect triopoly profits from
that period on. But if only one of them enters, say j, from the beginning of period t + 1
until entry of the second imitator the game continues as follows:
(i) The sellers simultaneously announce prices for knowledge: pt+τjl and p
t+τ
sl respectively,
for all τ = 1, 2... If imitator j bought a non-transferable contract at t, the convention is that
pt+τjl =∞ for all τ = 1, 2...Then:
(ii) Imitator l decides whether to enter the market -either by imitating, il, or by buying
knowledge from one of the sellers, cjl or csl- or not to enter, wl.
All parties observe the history of the game up to the beginning of period t and the
buyer(s) observe the contract(s) offered by the seller(s) at the beginning of period t.
A description of pure strategies follows.14 Let H t be the set of all histories up to, but
not including period t. A history ht ∈ H t includes all the past offers by the seller(s) and all
the decisions taken by the buyer(s). Let As(H
t) be the set of contracts for the inventor at t.
A contracting strategy of s is a sequence σ = {σt}∞t=0 of functions, each of which assigns to
each history a (possible pair of) contracts. Thus σt : H t → As(H t).15
For simplicity, we only define the strategy of, say, imitator j. Let Ht be the set of all
histories, at any period t, after s has offered a pair of contracts. Let Htj be the set of
all histories, at any period t, after the sellers (s and l) announced knowledge prices. An
imitation strategy of j is a sequence ϕj =
{
etj, d
t
j, p
t
jl
}∞
t=0
of three functions. Specifically
etj : Ht → {ij, cj, wj} is an entry function which assigns to each history an entry decision
before entry of any imitator. Similarly dtj : Htj → {ij, cjs, cjl, wj} is a decision function that
allocates to each history an entry decision after imitator l has entered. Last ptjl : H
t → [0,∞]
is a pricing function which maps each history to a price offer for imitator l.
We use Subgame-Perfect equilibria (SPE) and Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE) as so-
lution concepts. A SPE is a {σ, ϕj, ϕl} that forms a Nash equilibrium after every possible
history. In MPE strategies are functions only of payoff-relevant histories which are deter-
mined in our model by the number of buyers and sellers in the market for knowledge contract.
So we cluster all possible histories, according to the market structure, into three disjoint and
exhaustive subsets: (i) The subset of all histories in which the inventor is the unique seller
and the imitators are the buyers. Such a subgame is called the monopoly game; (ii) The sub-
set of all those histories in which the inventor and one of the imitators are the sellers. Such
a subgame is called the competitive game; and last: (iii) The remaining subset of histories
in which the inventor is the unique seller and there is a unique buyer.16 Such a subgame is
14The extension to behavioral strategies is direct
15To ease notation, we do not index strategies, as we should, by ∆.
16This corresponds to the case in which only one imitator previously entered by buying knowledge through
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called the bilateral monopoly game. Then a MPE is a SPE in which the contracting strategy
of the inventor is only a function of the market structure and the entry-decision functions of
the imitators depend only on the prices and type of contracts being offered.
3. Main Results: Appropriation without Patents
We introduce our main results in this section. Proposition 1 formalizes the lack of appro-
priability and fast imitation in the absence of knowledge trades, features which are typically
associated to inventions. This result should be contrasted with our main finding, in Propo-
sition 2: When knowledge trades are feasible, imitators strategically delay their entry to the
market and so the inventor becomes a temporary monopolist. Finally, in Proposition 3, we
show that the strategic delay in imitation is generated by the use of transferable contracts
which the inventor strictly prefers to the alternative of non-transferable contracting.
3.A. Innovative Rents without Knowledge Trading
Here, we analyze the dynamics of entry when contracting is not feasible. Thus, if potential
imitators choose to enter they must do so by imitating. We focus on pure strategies SPE.
We find that both imitators enter the market, without delay, at period zero.
Although we consider an economy without patent rights, the imitation cost works as an
entry barrier determining a natural measure of protection for the inventor. A value of κ
such that κ > Π2 is sufficient to protect the inventor from imitation: If κ > Π2 no imitator
copies and the inventor receives monopoly profits Π1. Thus, to make our problem interesting,
Assumption 1 is imposed throughout Sections 3 and 5.17
Assumption 1: 0 < κ < Π3
Assumption 1 ensures that copying is profitable for both imitators. Proposition 1 is our
benchmark result.
Proposition 1 Suppose knowledge cannot be traded. Then: (i) There is a unique SPE
in which both imitators imitate at period t = 0; and: (ii) The equilibrium payoffs for the
inventor and the imitators are Π3 and Π3 − κ respectively.
Proposition 1 shows that both imitators enter the market immediately. Indeed there
is no benefit from delaying entry since the entry cost will remain fixed at the level of the
imitation cost. Moreover, by delaying entry imitators sacrifice profits during the periods in
a non-transferable contract.
17In section 4 we extend Assumption 1 to the case of a large number of imitators.
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which they do not use the innovation. Hence, if entry occurs it will take place at period zero.
Assumption 1 ensures that entry does occurs as it is profitable for both imitators.
Proposition 1 summarizes the ‘conventional wisdom’ justifying the need for patent pro-
tection. In the absence of such protection, imitators enter immediately and compete away
the rents of the inventor. Foreseeing the risk that their reward might be insufficient to cover
their research costs, inventors might thus shy away from initially investing in research.
3.B. Appropriation with knowledge trading
We show that the results of Proposition 1 justifying patent protection are fundamentally
altered when trades in knowledge are feasible. We start by focusing our attention on trans-
ferable contracts and next we demonstrate that, indeed, the inventor strictly prefers to sell
knowledge through transferable rather than non-transferable contracts.
Knowledge trading
We focus on MPE. As we restrict our attention to the case of transferable contracts, after
entering, an imitator competes with the inventor to sell knowledge to the remaining imitator.
Thus, we only need to examine the competitive and monopoly subgames.18 First, we focus
on the competitive game. Suppose that imitator j has entered at period t. The sellers (j
and s) may, in subsequent periods, offer contracts to the buyer (l). The competitive game
has a unique MPE that we call the no-delay contracting equilibrium. Lemma 1 presents the
equilibrium outcome of the no-delay contracting equilibrium.
Lemma 1 In the unique MPE of the competitive subgame (that we call the no-delay con-
tracting equilibrium), knowledge is sold to imitator l immediately at period t + 1 at a zero
price.
In this equilibrium knowledge is sold immediately to the remaining imitator at a price
equal to its marginal cost. The sellers offer knowledge at a zero price at each period if
entry has not occurred yet. The buyer then has no incentive to delay his purchase since
knowledge is offered at its minimal price. For future reference, we call the contract through
which knowledge is offered after the first entry the second contract. We note that this
equilibrium is not necessarily the unique SPE of this continuation game. Section 6 examines
the potential multiplicity of SPE and provides a condition under which this equilibrium is
indeed the unique SPE of the competitive subgame.
18If both imitators enter simultaneously the entry game ends and players collect triopoly profits at every
period.
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We now determine the expected payoffs of the imitators. Imitator l, the follower imitator,
enters at t+1 by buying knowledge at a zero price. His expected equilibrium payoff in period
t is
δΠ3 (1)
The expected payoff of imitator j depends on his mode of entry. If he enters the market by
imitating, his expected payoff in period t is:
(1− δ)Π2 + δΠ3 − κ
as: (i) He obtains a flow of duopoly profits in period t; and: (ii) Since the no-delay equilibrium
is played, imitator l immediately enters at period t+ 1 and thus imitator j’s profits decrease
to triopoly profits pi3 thereon. If he instead enters the market by buying knowledge, his
expected payoff in period t is:
(1− δ)Π2 + δΠ3 − psj (2)
The only distinction between the payoff of imitator j if he enters by imitating rather than
by contracting resides in the entry cost. In particular, in neither case, does he expect to
obtain future profits from selling knowledge. Hence, to determine the mode of entry of the
imitators we need to examine the prices at which the inventor offers to sell knowledge. We
thus turn our attention to the monopoly game. We prove that the inventor offers to sell
knowledge to both imitators at prices less than or equal to the imitation cost. So, imitators
always enter the market by buying knowledge from the inventor rather than by imitating.
Lemma 2 In the monopoly game, the inventor offers knowledge to both imitators at prices
psg ≤ κ for g ∈ {j, l}.
The intuition is the following. The inventor can always do better by offering to sell
knowledge to an extra imitator at a price equal to κ at every period than by offering to
sell knowledge to only one of them. In this manner, she does not change the entry costs
and thus the entry decision of the imitators (the previously excluded imitator could always
enter by imitating and paying κ). However, she collects revenues from the execution of this
knowledge contract when the imitator enters the market.19
We still need to establish the optimal price for knowledge. First, however, we summarize
the payoffs of the imitators. If the leader imitator (the one who enters first and denoted by
superscript 1), enters at t, then, according to equations (1), (2) and Lemma 2, the payoffs
for him and the follower imitator, in period t, are
19The same idea applies to show that it is preferable to offer two contracts rather than no contract at all.
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V 1g = (1− δ)Π2 + δΠ3 − psg; V 2g = δΠ3 (3)
for g ∈ {j, l}. If both imitators enter simultaneously, payoffs in period t are
V bg = Π3 − psg (4)
Lemma 2 and some properties of these payoffs lead to our main results. Lemma 2 allows us
to view the imitators as choosing a time period at which to buy knowledge. So our reduced
form game closely resembles a ‘traditional’ timing game. The main difference is, however,
that the inventor, by choosing the price of knowledge affects the equilibrium structure of the
imitators’ payoffs and hence the nature of the timing game.
The Main Result
Now we characterize the equilibrium price of knowledge and the distribution of entry
times of the imitators. Our analysis is formalized by examining the equilibrium of a sequence
of games of period length ∆ that shrinks to zero.20 Proposition 2 presents one of the main
results of this paper.
Proposition 2 As ∆ shrinks to zero, there exists a unique symmetric MPE in which: (i)
The inventor sets a price for knowledge psg = κ for g ∈ {j, l}; (ii) The equilibrium dis-
tribution of entry times of each imitator converges to an exponential distribution with haz-
ard rate equal to λ = r (Π3 − κ) /κ; and (iii) The inventor’s equilibrium expected payoff is
Vs = µ(κ)Π1 + (1− µ(κ)) (Π3 + κ); where µ(κ) := r/ (r + 2λ) ∈ (0, 1).
Result (ii) shows that potential imitators wait a random length of time before entering
the market. The intuition is as follows. According to result (i), the price of the knowledge
sold through the first contract equals the imitation cost, κ. After the first sale, however, the
equilibrium price of knowledge drops to zero due to competition in the knowledge market.
Thus, as ∆ shrinks to zero, the payoff of the follower imitator becomes strictly greater than
the payoff of the leader. As a result, both players have an incentive to delay their entry. Delay
is, however, costly as both imitators sacrifice current market profits. Thus, in equilibrium,
potential imitators choose their entry times randomly (i.e., play a behavioral strategy) and
20There are however two degenerate, asymmetric pure strategy equilibrium in which imitator l (j) never
enters before j (l) and where imitator j (l) enters at date zero. Nonetheless, as an extensive previous
literature that has been concerned with similar issues, (see, for instance, Bolton and Farrel (1990) and some
of the references cited there), we believe that asymmetric pure strategy equilibria are both implausible and
unsuitable to examine imitation in a decentralized market environment.
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result (ii) indicates that the limiting distribution is exponential with hazard rate equal to
λ.21
The hazard rate, λ, must be interpreted as the instantaneous entry rate of each imitator
at any point in time. In a behavioral equilibrium, the benefit and cost, for each imitator,
of waiting an infinitesimal amount of time to enter must be the same. The cost of waiting
corresponds to the lost payoff during that infinitesimal amount of time: r (Π3 − κ). The
benefit of waiting is the avoided entry cost were his rival to enter first: λκ. So, we obtain
the expression reported in result (ii): λ = r (Π3 − κ) /κ.
It naturally follows from result (ii) that the inventor will hold a monopoly in the market
for a random time period until the time of the first entry. The expected length of this
monopoly time equals (2λ)−1. Indeed, since imitators use behavioral strategies, the time of
the first sale, t1 := min {ti, tj}, is a random variable. Moreover, t1 is exponentially distributed
with a hazard rate equal to 2λ and thus with expectation equal to (2λ)−1.22
Although our game resembles a classical timing game, the speed of entry is actually
endogenously determined by the pricing decision of the inventor. Result (i) sheds light on
this aspect. It describes the optimal pricing decision of the inventor, in other words the choice
of psg that maximizes her expected payoff given the equilibrium strategies of the imitators.
23
If she sets a unique price ps, the equilibrium hazard rate is λ(ps) = r (Π3 − ps) /ps and the
expected payoff for the inventor can be written as
Vs (ps) = µ (ps) Π1 + (1− µ (ps)) (Π3 + ps)
In this synthetic form, the above expression shows that the price of the knowledge (sold
through the first contract) ps has several effects. First, a higher price of knowledge raises
the revenues that the inventor collects when she sells it to the first buyer. Second, a higher
price for knowledge increases µ (ps), the discounted expected fraction of monopoly time.
Indeed, as ps increases, the benefit of waiting to enter increases and the imitators delay their
entry even more. There is nevertheless a third countervailing effect: As µ (ps) increases and
the imitators delay their entry times, the revenues from selling knowledge and the triopoly
profits are obtained later, potentially decreasing the present value of the expected payoff.
But because monopoly profits are larger than triopoly profits plus the largest revenue that
21This is a typical result in war of attrition games. War of Attrition games were first introduced by
Maynard Smith (1974). See, for example, Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) for a formal definition of a war of
attrition game and Hendricks et. al. (1988) for a full characterization.
22The minimum of two independent exponentially distributed random variables, ti and tj , is also expo-
nentially distributed with parameter (λi + λj). So its expectation is (λi + λj)
−1.
23Note that she optimally sets the same price for both contracts and thus induces the two imitators to
play the same strategy.
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the inventor may receive from selling knowledge, this third effect is always dominated by
the second one. Thus, the optimal choice for the inventor is to set the maximum price that
imitators will accept: The imitation cost.
The essential message of Proposition 2 is that, when knowledge can be traded, potential
imitators wait to enter the market and the innovator collects monopoly profits for a random
time period.
On The Optimality of Transferable Contracts
In Proposition 2 only transferable contracts were considered. This is restrictive since
the inventor might prefer to sell knowledge through non-transferable contracts that prevent
competition in the knowledge market. However, we show that the inventor always strictly
prefers to trade knowledge through transferable rather than non-transferable contracts. We
follow two steps. First, we obtain the inventor’s payoff when knowledge is sold through
non-transferable contracts. Second, we prove that this equilibrium reward is strictly smaller
than the equilibrium reward reported in result (iii) of Proposition 2.
We focus on MPE. In the case of non-transferrable contracts, competition in the market
for knowledge occurs only when an imitator enters by copying. The unique MPE of that
competitive game is still the no-delay contracting equilibrium of Lemma 1. Next we examine
the bilateral monopoly game that follows any history in which one of the imitators, say j,
has bought, at period t, knowledge through a non-transferable contract. This continuation
game exhibits a unique SPE.
Lemma 3 In the unique SPE of the bilateral monopoly game that starts at period t+ 1, the
inventor offers knowledge at a price pτsl = κ for all periods τ ≥ t + 1 and imitator l buys it
immediately at period t+ 1.
The inventor would like to promise the buyer to lower the price in the future to delay his
entry into the market. This promise is, however, not credible as once that period comes, she
has an incentive to keep the price high, and it is optimal for the buyer to accept such a high
offer rather than to incur the imitation cost. Using the results of Proposition 2 and Lemma
3, we obtain our second main finding.
Proposition 3 In the unique MPE when non-transferable contracts are used: (i) Both im-
itators enter at period t = 0 by buying knowledge at a price equal to κ; and: (ii) The
inventor’s equilibrium payoff V ns = Π3 + 2κ is strictly smaller than her equilibrium payoff Vs
when transferable contracts are used.
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As in the case without contracting (Proposition 1), the imitators perceive that their entry
cost will remain fixed through time and thus they decide to enter at period zero. However,
in the present case, the entry cost remains constant over time due to the non-transferability
clauses contained in the contracts. When using non-transferable contracts, the inventor
cannot commit to lower the price of knowledge in the future and so, from the point of view
of the imitators, she replicates the same ‘pricing’ environment as if knowledge could not
be traded. The inventor, however, obtains higher rents: She appropriates, in the form of
contracting revenues, what before were lost imitation costs.
Result (ii) shows that the inventor always prefers to use transferable rather than non-
transferable contracts. The intuition is as follows. Non-transferable contracts yield higher
revenues (two contracts, instead of one, are sold at a price of κ) and, moreover, these revenues
are received earlier (at period zero). However, the rents of the inventor are immediately
reduced to triopoly profits. Transferable contracts, on the other hand, allow the inventor to
commit to a lower future price of knowledge by introducing competition in the knowledge
market. As a result, potential imitators delay their entry. Hence, Proposition 3 stresses
that the extra profits due to the strategic delay in entry are larger than the lost contracting
revenues.
It is important to understand this trade-off more formally. According to result (iii)
of Proposition 2, the inventor’s equilibrium reward is Vs = µΠ1 + (1− µ) (Π3 + κ); for
µ = r/ (r + 2λ). Her equilibrium reward when non-transferable contracts are used is V ns =
Π3 + 2κ. Not forbidding resale is profitable if and only if µ (Π1 − Π3) > (1 + µ)κ. That
is, the extra expected discounted amount of money collected during her monopoly time,
µ (Π1 − Π3), must be large enough to compensate her for the sum of: (i) The lost contracting
revenues due to the fact that the price of knowledge is driven to zero due to competition: κ;
and: (ii) The lost contracting revenues due to the imitators’ delay: µκ.
But µ is determined by the equilibrium incentives of the imitators. In particular, the
payoff corresponding to entering at any time in the support of their randomization must
be equal to their expected payoffs if they follow their behavioral strategies. So: Π3 − κ =
(1− µ) (Π3 − κ2), where the left hand side is the payoff from buying knowledge at time zero
and the right hand side is the expected payoff from playing their corresponding behavioral
strategies. This equality implies that (1 + µ)κ = 2µΠ3, which in turns determine that
transferability is optimal if and only if Π1 > 3Π3, which is satisfied by Assumption 0.
24
Some empirical evidence suggests the importance of imposing less restrictive clauses
when patent protection is weak. Anand and Khanna (2000) report the percentage of non-
24An alternative to non-transferrable contracts would be for the inventor to commit to a decreasing price
schedule. The inventor would do weakly better. However, such commitments are not easy to put in place.
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exclusive licenses signed in their sample of contracts.25 For chemicals (mostly drugs in the
sample), the percentage of non-exclusive licenses is 12.36%, for computers 28.48% and for
electronics 30.35%. This evidence can be confronted to the data collected in the Carnegie
Mellon Survey, reported by Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2000), that asked managers about the
effective mechanisms to appropriate returns from innovative activities. For drugs, 50% of
managers reported that patents were effective, for computers 41% and for electronics 21%.26
So the sectors least likely to use patents are also those in which non-exclusive licenses are most
prevalent. Admittedly, exclusive licenses are not strictly equivalent to our non-transferrable
knowledge contracts but they are similar in the sense that they slow the speed at which prices
decrease in the future. This evidence therefore suggests that, in the spirit of our mechanism,
contracts that impose less restrictive terms and don’t prevent competition are beneficial for
the inventor when patent protection is weak.
Sources of rents and Comparative Statics
Having established the optimality of transferable contracts, it follows, from Propositions
1 and 2, that the extra reward received by the inventor is
Vs − Π3 = µ(κ) (Π1 − Π3) + (1− µ(κ))κ (5)
[Rewards from Delay] + [Revenues from Knowledge Sale]
The sources of rents come from both monopoly profits accumulated before entry of the
first imitator and from contracting revenues at the entry date. We are of course mostly
interested in the first source of rents.
We examine some comparative statics on these results. When κ increases, the expected
duration of monopoly time and the rents of the inventor increase. As κ → Π3, the cost
of waiting goes to zero and, in the limit, entry never happens: µ(κ) → 1. So, due to the
possibility of trading knowledge, the inventor becomes a permanent monopolist but precisely
because a trade occurs with an increasingly small probability on the equilibrium path. We
note that this can be true for a very small imitation cost. If the imitation cost and triopoly
profits are close and negligible, the innovator would obtain very small profits in the absence
of knowledge trading but collects profits close to monopoly rents if contracting is possible.
Corollary 1 In the unique limiting symmetric MPE: (i) The expected duration of monopoly
time and the inventor’s expected equilibrium payoff are strictly increasing in the imitation
25See Table III (i) in their paper.
26See Table I in their paper.
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cost, κ; and: (ii) The inventor’s expected equilibrium payoff converges monotonically to the
present value of monopoly profits, Π1, as κ converges to Π3.
We finish this discussion with an illustrative example. Consider a product that generates
monopoly profits of Π1 = $1M and triopoly profits of Π3 = $0.1M. We vary κ between 0 and
Π3. We present the results in the following table. In the first column, we report the expected
duration of monopoly time. In the second, we report the expected discounted profits of the
inventor derived from Result (iii) in Proposition 2. In the last three columns, we decompose
the percentage contributions of the different revenue streams: (i) Percentage coming from
monopoly profits before entry (µ(κ)Π1); (ii) Percentage coming from triopoly profits after
entry ((1−µ(κ))Π3); and: (iii) Percentage obtained from the sale of knowledge ((1−µ(κ))κ).
The results indicate that if the cost of reverse engineering the process is $10000, the
inventor expects to retain monopoly profits for half a year and overall to obtain profits
of $160000 (compared to $100000 without trading of knowledge). If the cost of reverse
engineering is $30000 (resp $50000), entry would be prevented on average for more than 2
(resp. 5 years) and the innovator would obtain profits of $360000 (resp $430000), more than
three (resp. four) times what she would obtain in the absence of contracting. We see that
even for relatively small imitation costs, the rents of the innovator can be quite substantial.
κ ($M)
Dur. Mon.
Time (years)
Discounted
Profits
of innovator ($M)
% Before
Entry
% After
Entry
% Contracting
Revenues
0.01 0.56 0.16 34 60 6
0.02 1.25 0.22 51 41 8
0.03 2.14 0.36 62 29 9
0.05 5 0.43 77 15 8
0.07 12 0.62 88 7 5
0.09 45 0.85 96 2 2
0.095 95 0.92 98 1 1
0.099 495 0.98 100 0 0
4. Large Number of Imitators
After having examined the essential economics of strategic delay in imitation and the
value of transferable contracts, we extend the model of Section 3 to any number of potential
imitators, N ≥ 2. To simplify the exposition, we directly focus on the continuous time version
16
of our model and without loss of generality we assume that the inventor offers transferable
contracts.27
For any number of active imitators n ≤ N, we posit that, in the product market, there
is a unique level of equilibrium profit per firm denoted (in present value terms) by Πn+1 for
n = 0, 1...We assume that {Πn+1}∞n=0 is a strictly decreasing sequence that converges to zero.
Example 1 illustrates this idea.
Example 1. Consider a ‘Cournot’ market with n + 1 active rivals, marginal cost equal
to zero and (inverse) linear demand equal to p = 1 − X if X ≤ 1 and 0 otherwise. In this
case there is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in which profits are Πn+1 = (n+ 2)
−2.
Assumption 1, imposed in the previous sections, ensured the profitability of imitation for
the case of two potential imitators, N = 2. However, for a number of potential imitators N
sufficiently large, individual market profits ΠN will be smaller than any fixed imitation cost
κ. To retain the spirit of Assumption 1, and the idea that imitation is ex-ante profitable for
all potential imitators, we depart from the assumption of a fixed cost and we assume that
the imitation cost, κN, is also a decreasing function of the number of potential imitators.
28
Thus, in a similar vein to Assumption 1, we impose:
Assumption 2: ∀N ≥ 2: (ΠN+1 − κN) > 0.
Under Assumption 2, Proposition 1 generalizes for any number of potential imitators
N: The unique SPE is such that (i) All potential imitators imitate immediately at t = 0;
and: (ii) As N→∞, the inventor’s equilibrium payoff converges to zero. Thus, the inventor
would not invest in research. This appears to be the perfect justification of the need for
patent protection.
We discover that, as in the previous sections, the possibility of contracting affects this
reasoning as shown in the following generalization of Proposition 2:
Proposition 4 Under Assumption 2, there is a MPE such that: (i) The optimal price of
knowledge is pN = κN for a given N; (ii) The distribution of entry times of each imitator
is exponential with hazard rate equal to λN = r (ΠN+1 − κN) / (N− 1)κN; and (iii) The
inventor’s equilibrium payoff is Vs = µNΠ1+(1−µN) [κN + ΠN+1]; where µN ≡ r/ [r + NλN].
27It is without a loss of generality that we analyze directly the continuous time version of our game since,
as shown in the proof of Proposition 2, it corresponds to the limit of the discrete version when ∆→ 0
28In a previous version we showed that when ΠN+1 < κN there is a SPE in which no imitator ever
enters because after entry, competition on the knowledge market leads to full diffusion, and the profits ΠN+1
obtained by the initial imitator are not sufficient to cover the imitation cost κN.
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Proposition 4 shows that, when contracting is possible, the inventor retains a positive
equilibrium payoff since imitators strategically wait before entering the market. We now
examine the limit results when the inventor faces a very large pool of potential imitators.
Note that, unavoidably, when N becomes large, both profits in the product market
and the optimal price of knowledge become negligible. Hence, this suggests that when the
number of potential imitators increases the inventor’s rents dissipate. However this reasoning
is correct only if the length of the delay in imitation remains small. In other words, the
traditional held belief that innovative rents evaporate is true if and only if the discounted
monopoly time, µN, goes to zero, when the pool of potential imitators grows large.
We show in the following proposition, that what matters is not the limit value of profits
limN→∞[ΠN+1] but the speed of convergence or the ratio between these profits and the
imitation cost at the limit. We impose an extra assumption that states that {Πn+1}∞n=0 and
{κN}∞N=2 are of the same order of magnitude at the limit.
Assumption 3: limN→∞[ΠN+1/κN] = b for b finite and weakly larger than 1.
Proposition 5 reveals that the key determinant of the innovator’s rents is the limit ratio
b. Furthermore, it shows that in the case in which b = 1, the inventor’s payoff converges to
monopoly profits.
Proposition 5 Let Assumptions 2 and 3 hold. As N→∞
VN → rΠ1
r + b− 1
and if b = 1, then VN → Π1.
In our view, Proposition 5 fundamentally challenges the traditional belief that innovation
cannot occur in a world with a large number of imitators. To shed light on the mechanism
behind the result notice that the limiting discounted fraction of monopoly time is
lim
N→∞
µN ≡ lim
N→∞
r
[r + NλN]
=
r
r + b− 1
Thus, at the limit, the length of monopoly time depends on the expected date of the first
sale (i.e, first entry) and hence on, what we loosely call, the limiting ‘aggregate’ hazard rate:
lim
N→∞ NλN. Proposition 5 shows then that as N → ∞, NλN → b − 1. The intuition of
this result is as follows.
First, as a direct consequence of Assumption 3, as N→∞, the ratio r (ΠN+1 − κN) /κN
converges to b− 1. This, however, is not sufficient for NλN to converge to a finite number.
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However, as shown in Proposition 4, λN is divided by N − 1 and so overall, the whole
expression, NλN, also converges to b − 1. The fact that λN is divided by N − 1 clarifies
the role that the free-riding effect between potential imitators has on entry times. The
probability that each potential imitator has of obtaining a knowledge contract for free rises
with the size of the pool of potential rivals, N − 1, as each potential imitator will receive
the required knowledge for free if at least one of the other N−1 potential imitators signs
a contract with the inventor first. So, the incentives of each potential imitator to be the
first in buying knowledge are dramatically diminished as N grows large. Even at the limit,
non-negligible externalities among potential imitators are present in the equilibrium and the
inventor exploits them to earn substantial rewards.
5. Subgame Perfect Equilibria: Further Results
In this section we answer the following question: Is the no-delay contracting equilibrium
the unique SPE of the competitive game? A negative answer to this question reveals that
the ‘speed’ at which the second contract determines the inventor’s reward.
Uniqueness
To simplify, we use continuous time and, without loss of generality, we assume that
knowledge is sold through transferable contracts. Competition to sell knowledge to the
follower imitator (i.e., the second contract) starts instantaneously at time t, with the entry
of the first imitator, say j. Let t2 ≥ t be the time at which the second contract is sold and
thus d2 ≡ (t2 − t) ≥ 0 is the delay in trading the second contract. The no-delay contracting
equilibrium, which is the unique MPE corresponds to d2 = 0. We will see in this section
that some SPE might actually be characterized by a strictly positive delay in trading the
second contract. Note that, d2, characterized by Π3 − κ = Π3e−rd2 , is the maximum length
of time that imitator l is willing to wait to buy knowledge through the second contract at
a zero price rather than imitating immediately at t. Proposition 6 describes the set of pure
strategy SPE (outcomes) of the competitive game.
Proposition 6 Consider the competitive game. Then: (i) If 2Π3 > Π2 the no-delay con-
tracting equilibrium is the unique SPE; and (ii) If 2Π3 ≤ Π2, for each d2 ∈
[
0, d2
]
there
exists a SPE in which imitator l enters the market at t2 = t + d2 by buying knowledge at a
zero price.
Result (i) shows that, for some environments, the unique SPE is the no-delay contracting
equilibrium. For linear demand and Cournot competition, this condition is satisfied. The
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intuition is as follows. When 2Π3 > Π2, the market is such that for any candidate equilibrium
with delay in the knowledge market, a profitable deviation exists for one of the sellers.
Indeed, suppose knowledge is believed to be sold at a price of zero with a delay d > 0.
Selling knowledge to imitator l at the highest acceptable price, ζΠ3, allows the deviator to
collect extra profits of 2ζΠ3 rather than ζΠ2 in the market (where ζ = [1− e−rt]).29
Result (ii) stresses that, if this condition is not satisfied, the competitive game might
admit a multiplicity of SPE. In all of these SPE the price of knowledge sold through the
second contract is zero. This is because the seller with the lowest price will serve the entire
market and so each seller has an incentive to undercut his rival. However, all of these SPE are
characterized by different delays to trade knowledge. An outcome in which the knowledge is
sold through the second contract with a delay 0 ≤ d2 ≤ d2 is a SPE for two reasons. First,
imitator l, given that d2 ≤ d2, (weakly) prefers to wait d2 to buy knowledge through the
second contract at a zero price rather than imitating immediately. Second, the sellers, when
2Π3 ≤ Π2, (weakly) prefer collecting duopoly profits rather than deviating and receiving the
contracting revenues.
Delay in contracting and Appropriation
The existence of delay to trade knowledge through the second contract brings one concep-
tual novelty: The imitator who enters first (the leader) collects duopoly profits in the market
up to the time of the second entry. It may become worthwhile, if the delay is sufficiently
long, for imitators to become leaders rather than followers. To simplify the presentation
of our next result, we define a critical time delay to trade knowledge through the second
contract as d˜2 ≡ r−1 [ln (Π2/ (Π2 − κ))] and note that d˜2 ∈
(
0, d2
)
. Also for any d2 ∈
[
0, d2
]
,
let α2 ≡ (1− e−rd2). We obtain the following results
Proposition 7 Suppose that 2Π3 ≤ Π2. Then: (i) If 0 ≤ d2 < d˜2, the inventor offers to
sell knowledge to both imitators at a price ps = κ; the distribution of entry times for each
imitator is exponential with hazard rate λ = r [(Π3 − κ) + α2 (Π2 − Π3)] / [κ− α2Π2]; and the
inventor’s equilibrium payoff is Vs = µ(κ)Π1 + (1 − µ(κ)) [(Π3 − κ) + α2 (Π2 − Π3)], where
µ(κ) is defined as in Proposition 2; (ii) If d˜2 ≤ d2 < d2, as ∆→ 0, the unique SPE outcome
is that entry happens for sure at t = 0; the inventor offers to sell knowledge to both imitators
at a price ps = κ; and her equilibrium payoff is V
d
s = φV
n
s + (1− φ)V0, where φ (κ, d2) is the
probability of simultaneous entry at t = 0, V ns ≡ 2κ+Π3; and V0 ≡ [κ+ α2Π2 + (1− α2) Π3].
29Note that this informal argument is valid if ζΠ3 < κ but the result holds generally as shown in the proof
of Proposition 6.
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Proposition 7 proves that, depending on the length of the delay to trade knowledge
through the second contract, imitators will follow very different strategies. Result (i) shows
that when the second contract is traded relatively ‘quickly’, the dynamics of entry is still
governed by a waiting process between the imitators. This result may be considered as
a generalization of Proposition 2. The main difference is that the inventor now collects
duopoly profits after the first imitator enters the market. However, we cannot conclude that
the inventor strictly prefers this case to the case where d2 = 0. Indeed, as d2 increases, the
equilibrium hazard rate of each imitator also increases and thus the inventor accumulates
monopoly profits for a shorter time period.30
Result (ii) reveals a new aspect of the appropriability problem. It states that when
the delay to exchange the second contract is ‘too long’ the dynamics of entry is completely
reversed: Entry of at least one imitator takes place for sure at time t = 0. The game becomes
a preemption game: Both imitators want to be leaders but they do not enter at date zero
with probability one because the payoff from simultaneous entry is strictly smaller than the
payoff from being the follower imitator.
Result (ii) also specifies the equilibrium payoff of the inventor in this second case. It
can be shown that her equilibrium payoff is strictly smaller than the equilibrium payoff that
she obtains when d2 = 0 : Vs > V
d
s : ∀d2 ∈
[
d˜2, d2
]
.31 Proposition 7 can be summarized as
follows. When potential imitators correctly believe that knowledge will be diffused slowly
in the knowledge market, entry will be inevitably fast. Thus, if an appropriation failure is
likely to exist, it is not caused by a lack of intellectual property rights per se but rather by
a different kind of problem coming from a slow diffusion of knowledge.
6. Some Evidence
In this section we provide suggestive evidence which reveals both the importance of
knowledge trading and the potential relevance of the appropriation mechanism highlighted
in this paper. In our theoretical exercise we underlined the existence of a natural and intuitive
market force which generates innovative rents in the absence of patent protection. Finding
empirical evidence of such forces is not an immediate exercise since patents are so prevalent
30In which SPE is the inventor’s reward the highest? Several offsetting forces makes it difficult to answer
this question. The higher d2, the longer the period for which she retains duopoly profits after the first
entry. Also, the higher d2, the higher λ and so duopoly profits and contracting revenues are received earlier.
However, the first entry occurs, on average, earlier and the inventor obtains monopoly rents for a shorter
period.
31Result (ii) indicates that the reward of the inventor is a convex combination of V ns , the same reward as
that of Proposition 3, and V0, the reward that she obtains when only one of the imitators enters at t = 0 and
the other follows after a delay of at least d˜2. From Proposition 3 we know that: Vs > V ns . Besides, direct
calculations show that Vs > V0 for all values of d2 ∈
[
d˜2, d2
]
. So Vs > V ds : ∀d2 ∈
[
d˜2, d2
]
.
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in many industrial sectors of developed countries. We nevertheless identify two classes of
situations where our mechanism is most likely to play a key role. First, our mechanism might
play an important role in countries where intellectual property protection is weak or non-
existent. Second, for those countries in which legal protection is stronger, our mechanism
may rationalize the use of secrecy which does not shield inventors from reverse engineering
by imitators.32
We start by briefly discussing the evidence which suggests the existence of an active
knowledge market. There appears to exist a robust market for technological know-how
that does not involve patents (see Contractor (1985), Rostoker (1983) and Bessen, (2005)).
According to the European Commission, pure know-how licensing agreements, that involve
secret information, are playing an increasingly key role in the transfer of technology (Harris,
(1997)). Moreover, as Gallini (2002) has also pointed out, components of technical know-
how absent from patent applications are often transferred through licensing contracts in high
technology industries, such as software and biotechnology (See, also Arora, 2002).
Although these types of contracts appear to be relevant in practice, detailed data is
much scarcer than the data on licensing agreements, for which more extensive information
on contract terms and timing is available. Thus we initially resort to indirect evidence which
suggest that our mechanism could be important in practice. Two very influential surveys
(Yale Survey (1983) and Carnegie Mellon Survey (1994)) have asked managers to rank the
most effective means of protecting their innovations. The Yale Survey, conducted in 1983,
reports that for both product and process innovations, secrecy was consistently ranked as
one of the worst methods to protect an innovation. The Carnegie Mellon Survey, conducted
ten years later, reports, on the contrary, that secrecy was consistently ranked first. As Cohen
et.al. (2000) point out, there is no apparent explanation for the ‘growth in the importance
of secrecy as an appropriability mechanism’. This fact is particularly surprising, since the
period between 1983 and 1994 was one in which patent protection tended to strengthen.
We believe that the mechanism highlighted in this paper offers a potential explanation for
this puzzle. Indeed, a firm choosing secrecy is not protected against reverse engineering by
rivals.33 However, as emphasized in this paper, in the presence of active markets for knowl-
edge, imitators might delay entry. Thus, more active knowledge markets might increase the
relative returns that firms can expect from choosing secrecy. Did the markets for knowledge
indeed increase in importance during that period?
32An inventor can choose trade secret as an alternative to patenting. She is thus protected against illegal
copying of the invention (such as corrupting an employee) but not against reverse engineering. However,
unlike in the case of patenting, she does not need to reveal the details of the invention.
33In the case of secrecy, reverse engineering is allowed although obviously paying the competitor’s employees
for the secret is illegal.
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As pointed out earlier, there is no systematic data on contracts to transfer knowledge or
know-how in the absence of intellectual property rights. There is however more systematic
information about licensing markets. We believe that the trading activity in the licensing
market (agreements to use patent rights) and in what we call the knowledge market (agree-
ments to exchange knowledge services, designs, codes, etc.) should be positively correlated.
An indication that our belief is well founded can be found in Arora et. al. (2002) who states
that licensing contracts, based on patents, often also include transfer of know how, such as
sending teams to explain the technology to the buyer. Licensing activity did indeed intensify
in the period 1983 to 1994. Arora et.al. (2002) using data compiled by the Securities Data
Company report that the total number of disclosed licensing deals during the period 1985 to
1989 was 1130 while for the years 1993 and 1994, 2009 and 2426 deals were signed respec-
tively.34 If the increase in licensing activity is a good indicator of an increase in trading of
knowledge, our model provides a convincing theoretical foundation for the apparent puzzle
of the rise in popularity of secrecy.
To find more specific anecdotal evidence of the importance of our mechanism, it is natural
to search for case studies in countries in which patent protection is weak or even non-existent.
Until the recent TRIPS agreements, India did not grant product patents but process patents.
This had important practical consequences, for instance, for the pharmaceutical sector: It
meant that Indian generic producers could reverse engineer drugs from western big pharma
companies and sell them in India as long as they used a slightly different process of produc-
tion. Lanjow (1998) notes that the average delay between the date of world introduction by
the inventor and the date of introduction in India is between 3 to 5 years.35 Although the
author mentions that this unusually long delay might be due to regulatory deferrals, some
circumstantial evidence suggests that a mechanism such as the one described in this paper
could also be at play.
Consider the story of the compound oseltamivir (marketed by Roche as the famous
Tamiflu). It was approved in the US in 1999. In October 2005, the Indian generic producer
Cipla announced a plan to begin manufacture of generic oseltamivir without a license from
Roche.36 In December 2005, presumably as a response, Roche granted a sub license to
another Indian generic manufacturer, Hetero Drugs, for the production of osteltamivir. A
similar pattern is observed for the production of HIV antiretroviral drugs in South Africa. In
February 2001, Cipla announced plans to sell aids antiretroviral drugs to sub Saharan Africa
and in September 2001 GSK, the patent owner, granted rights free of charge to Aspen, a
34The Securities Data Company contains data on licensing deals and joint ventures
35This data is obtained from a sample of ‘blockbuster drugs’ marketed in 1993.
36Even though this occurred after the TRIPS agreement was signed, the production of oseltamivir by
Cipla was allowed by an Indian court that judged that the patent was not infringed.
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local generic producer. In both cases, Hetero Drugs and Aspen obtained the knowledge at a
smaller cost than Cipla and one reason for the delayed entry could be that, for some period
of time, both generic producers preferred to wait, hoping that their rival would move first.37
These examples and the data on delay presented in Lanjow (1998) correspond to well-
known successful drugs. However more examples of less popular drugs, or other inventions,
may also exist. The difficulty is that these cases are not well documented. In general, we
believe that our theoretical work opens the way for further empirical analysis and could
provide a framework to conduct it.
Finally, note that our mechanism highlights an important and subtle connection between
secrecy and lead time, two appropriation mechanisms that might not actually be independent
as the formulation of the Yale and Carnegie Mellon surveys suggests.38 When inventors do
not patent their technologies and imitators strategically delay their entry, an endogenous
lead time emerges as the equilibrium outcome. So our findings also shed light on a potential
interesting relationship between secrecy and lead time.
7. Related Literature
Our results show that there exists previously ignored sources of rents for inventors even in
the absence of patent protection. Our paper is thus connected with a literature that argues
in favor of weakening intellectual property rights (Boldrin and Levine (2002, 2005, 2008a)
and Maurer and Scotchmer (2002)). Our intended goal is to depart in a minimal way from
the ‘conventional’ model that justifies patent protection, by only introducing the possibility
of trading knowledge.
In Boldrin and Levine (2002, 2005, 2008a), an inventor creates an initial prototype which
can be used for both producing additional copies of the innovation and also for consumption.
The inventor competes directly with the buyers of her copies. She can therefore sell the initial
prototype at a price that reflects the future utility and revenue stream that it will generate.39
We highlight, in particular, an important difference between our and their approach. We
clearly separate two markets: The product market, from which the rents of the inventor
come from, and the market for knowledge. In our model, the inventor does not compete
with her own consumers but rather with potential imitators who might ‘steal’ the inventor’s
37We point out that one feature of the model is not reflected in this example but does not matter for
the results: The first imitator, Cipla, entered in both cases by imitating and not by contracting with the
innovator. Note however that our model would yield exactly the same results if the innovator was assumed
not to offer a contract before the entry of at least one imitator; the cost of entry would still fall from κ (cost
of imitating) to zero after the first entry due to competition on the market for knowledge.
38Both Arundel (2001) and Cohen et al (2000) found that in the majority of manufacturing industries
innovators considered secrecy and lead time as the crucial appropriation mechanisms.
39This price is positive and potentially substantial due to the initial scarcity of the innovated commodity.
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customers. So, the inventor uses the dynamics of the trading of knowledge to delay the entry
of potential imitators and remain a monopolist for a longer time period.
Maurer and Scotchmer (2002) also indirectly argue for a change in the patent system
by analyzing the effects of introducing independent invention defence. The authors show,
in an static model, that the inventor can use licensing to deter duplication if the imitation
cost is sufficiently high. We focus, instead, on the dynamics of knowledge trading and show
that relatively ‘small’ imitation costs can lead to a permanent monopoly position for the
inventor.40 Moreover, our results stress the importance of using transferable contracts as a
tool that provides credibility to future price reductions.
The mechanism we study leads to delay in imitation. Other explanations for the existence
of such delays have also been proposed.41 Benoit (1985) shows that a unique imitator might
want to delay entry on the market if the profitability of her innovation is uncertain and
gradually revealed over time. In Choi (1998) endogenous delay also occurs as a consequence of
the strategic interaction between imitators in a context of patent infringement suits brought
by the patent holder.42 Note also that in static frameworks, some papers have shown that
licensing can serve as a barrier to entry (Gallini (1984) and Rockett (1990)). In these papers,
licensing is used to deter the development of a superior technology and to crowd out the
market to prevent entry of superior rivals.
The market for knowledge is also the focus of Muto (1986). This paper shares with ours
the focus on resale of information. However there are several major differences. First, in
Muto (1986), an important restriction is imposed: If no sale occurs in a period, the game
ends. This removes the possibility of waiting to enter. Second, imitation is not a possibility
in that paper. As a consequence, naturally, it is optimal to restrict resale, both in terms of
profits of the monopolist and in terms of diffusion rates.
Selling ideas in the absence of patent protection is a subtle issue as Anton and Yao (1994,
2002) have underlined. If buyers cannot assess the value of an idea they may be reluctant
to pay the sellers, but when the idea is revealed buyers might potentially steal it. Anton
and Yao (1994, 2002) propose subtle solutions to that problem. In our environment, the
innovation is already commercialized in the market and its success is publicly observable.
40In contrast, the condition in Maurer and Scotchmer (2002) states that the imitation cost needs to be
more than half the initial invention cost.
41Scherer and Ross (1980) suggest that technological constraints generate ‘natural lags’ in imitation. This
explanation does not depend on the strategic responses of imitators.
42Bernheim (1984) also examines the dynamics of entry deterrence. The dynamics is however very different
than in our model. In particular, Bernheim (1984) assumes that entrants are ordered in an exogenously given
sequence. Arora and Fosfuri (2003) highlights that it may be optimal for a firm to license out its technology
to a rival. This paper shares some similarities with what we have called the competitive game: The trade-off
considered in that paper is comparable to the one that guarantees uniqueness of the no-delay contracting
equilibrium in the competitive game.
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So, we believe that asymmetries of information are minimal and the concerns studied by
Anton and Yao (1994, 2002) can be left aside.
Last, we highlight a technical point. Our game is shown to be a timing game and in
certain circumstances corresponds to a war of attrition (Maynard Smith (1974), Fudenberg
and Tirole (1991), Hendricks et. al. (1988)). However, in our context, the speed of entry is
not exogenously given by the parameters of the game but is endogenously controlled by the
pricing decisions of the inventor. We thus solve simultaneously for the entry rate in a war
of attrition and the pricing decision of an inventor facing multiple imitators.
8. Concluding Remarks
The main goal of this paper was to study natural market forces that protect rents of
innovators faced with easy imitation. We show that the introduction of a market for knowl-
edge fundamentally affects the traditional view on the need for patent protection. Even in
the absence of such protection, imitators strategically delay their entry and the inventor
accumulates monopoly profits for a random time period. In essence, we have shown that
potential knowledge trades between inventors and imitators serve as good substitutes for
patents in terms of guaranteeing rents for the inventor.
To examine the appropriability problem in the presence of knowledge trading and revisit
the conventional wisdom on intellectual property rights, we built the simplest possible model.
We made abstraction of certain issues which could be the object of future research. We
mention two of those. First, we assumed that the imitation cost is commonly known. It
would be interesting to presume that imitators have private information about their imitation
costs and to examine how this affects the inventor’s equilibrium payoff. Second, our model
does not consider the possibility of sequential invention. Contracting in that case might
provide not only knowledge to reproduce the current innovation but also to discover future
improvements.
We believe, however, that the theory constructed in this paper opens a central ques-
tion for further research: Without intellectual property rights, do inventors appropriate an
equilibrium reward equal to the social value of their contribution (see Makowski and Os-
troy (1995))? Shapiro (2007) has argued that under the current patent system inventors
receive private rewards that exceed their social contributions. Could the dynamic pricing of
knowledge appropriately tailor these rents to their social contributions?
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. A pure strategy for imitator g prescribes, at each t, whether
to imitate ig or to wait wg. Consider the decision problem following a history in which only
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one imitator, say l, has imitated at period t−1. Then: j’s unique best response is to imitate
at t. By imitating at any tj ≥ t he obtains a payoff in period t of Vj(tj) = δ(tj−t) (Π3 − κ)
and t = arg maxtj≥t Vj(tj). We now turn our attention to those histories starting at t and
in which no imitator has imitated yet. Given the symmetry of the game, we study j’s best
response to the following two strategies of l. First, suppose that l’s strategy is il at t. Then:
j’s unique best response is ij at t. This follows because if he waits until tj ≥ t he receives
a payoff in period t equal to Vj(tj) = δ
(tj−t) (Π3 − κ) and t = arg maxtj≥t Vj(tj). Second,
suppose that l’s strategy dictates to wait until tl > t. Then: j’s unique best response is also
ij at t. To see this, recall that we showed that if j imitates at tj < tl, l’s best response is
to imitate at tj + 1. Thus, if j chooses ij at tj such that: t ≤ tj < tl he obtains a payoff in
period t of Vj(t) = δ
(tj−t) [(1− δ) Π2 + δΠ3 − κ]. But if he chooses ij at tj ≥ tl he receives
a payoff in period t of Vj(t) = δ
(tj−t) [Π3 − κ]. Comparing these payoffs, it follows that j’s
unique best response is to imitate at t.
So, this analysis reveals that there is a unique SPE in which the imitators choose to
imitate immediately at all periods in which imitation has not occurred yet. Thus, the
unique equilibrium outcome is both imitators choosing to imitate at period zero and the
equilibrium payoff for the inventor and the imitators are Π3 and Π3 − κ respectively. 
Proof of Lemma 1. A (Markovian) strategy for the sellers (j and s) specifies a price
at which they offer knowledge through a contract (hereafter, a contract) if l has not entered
yet. Imitator l’s decision rule dictates whether to enter or not and how to enter as a function
of the prices. We follow a sequence of steps. In step 1, we show that the unique pair of
stationary prices that can be part of an equilibrium is psl = pjl = 0 as claimed in Lemma 1.
In step 2, we show that the buyer has also a unique best response and thus that the no-delay
contracting equilibrium is the unique MPE.
Step 1. First: l will enter for sure. This follows since he can imitate immediately at t+1
and obtain a payoff in period t of δ (Π3 − κ) > 0. Second: Entry will occur by contracting.
Suppose it were not the case. Then one of the sellers (j or s) might deviate, at the time of
entry, and offer a contract at a price equal to κ that would be accepted by l. This deviation
is payoff profitable since: (i) It increases the contracting revenues of the seller from zero to a
strictly positive amount; and: (ii) It does not affect the present value of the market profits
of the deviant seller as entry would have taken place at that period anyway. Thus we can
rule out as equilibrium candidates any pair of stationary prices above κ. Furthermore, any
pair of stationary prices at which one or both sellers get positive contracting revenues is not
immune to a profitable deviation. At least one of them might decrease his/her price and
increase his/her contracting revenues without affecting the present value of his/her market
profits; and: (iii) Any pair of stationary prices at which one seller sets a zero price and the
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other a positive price is not resistant to a profitable deviation by the lowest price seller.
Indeed, he or she can find a higher price to increase his or her contracting revenue without
affecting his or her market profits. Thus the unique pair of stationary prices that can be
part of an equilibrium is psl = pjl = 0 (Bertrand outcome).
Step 2. We show that the equilibrium strategy of the buyer is unique. Say that l
observes a pair of prices {psl, pjl} different from psl = pjl = 0. Let m ≡ j, s denote the
seller who offers the minimal price and pm ≡ minm∈{j,s} pml. His unique best response is:
contract clm if pm ≤ min [κ, (1− δ)Π3]; imitate il if κ ≤ min [pm, (1− δ)Π3]; and wait wl if
min [pm, κ] > (1− δ)Π3. These strategies follow naturally from the fact that by waiting one
period, the imitator can get the contract at a zero price next period but abandons triopoly
profits during the current period. Hence, the buyer’s decision rule and the price offers at
any period psl = pjl = 0 constitute the unique MPE. 
Proof of Lemma 2. A (Markovian) contracting strategy specifies a time-independent
pair of prices psg ∈ [0,∞] for g ∈ {j, l} if entry has not happened yet. An optimal contracting
strategy must be inclusive: Two knowledge contracts must be offered at prices psg ≤ κ for g ∈
{j, l}. We prove this lemma by showing that for any (Markovian) contracting strategy which
excludes an imitator there exists an inclusive contracting strategy that performs (weakly)
better for the inventor.
Consider, first, a strategy which excludes both imitators: Prices are psg = ∞ for g ∈
{j, l}. Then, the inventor prefers the contracting strategy in which two contracts are offered
at psg = κ for g ∈ {j, l}. To see this, observe that:
1. For the imitators both strategies are payoff equivalent since: (i) Their mode of entry,
contracting or imitating, does not affect the profits that they collect in the market; (ii) Under
both strategies, their entry cost is equal to κ if they enter first. (They can enter by imitating
in the first case); and: (iii) The price of knowledge for the second contract will be equal to
zero since competition is assured after the first entry.
2. The inventor, however, prefers the second (inclusive) contracting strategy since: (i)
The entry times of the imitators have not been affected and so the present value of her market
profits are the same under both contracting strategies; and: (ii) When entry happens, it takes
places through contracting and the inventor receives strictly positive contracting revenues.
It follows that the same type of argument applies to show that there exists an inclusive
strategy that the inventor prefers to a contracting strategy which excludes only one of the
imitators. 
Proof of Proposition 2. We follow a number of steps. Step 1 shows that when ∆
(length of the period) is small enough there exists a unique symmetric MPE in which the
imitators use behavioral strategies. Step 2 obtains the limiting equilibrium distribution as
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∆ → 0. Step 3 determines the inventor’s expected payoff for a pair of prices psj and psl.
Last, step 4 shows that the optimal prices are psj = psl = κ.
Step 1. If δ ≥ δu ≡ (Π2−κ)/Π2 and if ming∈{j,l} {psg} ∈ I(δ) = (pδ, κ], for pδ ≡ (1−δ)Π2
there exists a unique symmetric MPE in which the imitators use behavioral strategies.
If ming∈{j,l} {psg} > pδ then for g ∈ {j, l}: (i) V 2g − V 1g > 0; (ii) V 2g − V bg > 0 and; (iii)
δtV 1g is strictly decreasing in t.
43 Thus our game closely resembles a war of attrition. Note
that δ ≥ δu guarantees that pδ ≤ κ and thus I(δ) 6= ∅.
Notation: p ≡ (psj, psl) ∈ I(δ) × I(δ) denotes a given price list offered by s. Let
ψg : I(δ)× I(δ)→ [0, 1] be the probability function used by imitator g at each period t when
deciding whether to buy knowledge (a contract from now on) or not, conditional on the game
having reached that period.
Definitions: Let Qj(ψl) ≡ ψlV bj +(1−ψl)V 1j be the value for j of buying a contract in the
current period and let Wj(ψl) ≡ ψlV 2j +(1−ψl)δQj(ψl) be the value for j of buying a contract
in the next period. Thus, the net value of waiting a period is: Wj (ψl) ≡ Wj (ψl)−Qj (ψl).
A necessary condition for an equilibrium in behavioral strategies to exist is:
Wj (ψl) = ψl(V 2j − V bj ) + (1− ψl)(δQj(ψl)− V 1j ) = 0
Existence: Wj (ψl) = 0 has at least one solution ψ∗l ∈ (0, 1). First, note that: Wj (0) =
δQj(0)− V 1j = −V 1j (1− δ) < 0. Second, observe that: Wj (1) > 0 as Wj (1) = (V 2j − V bj ) =
psj − Π3 (1− δ) > 0 ⇐⇒ psj > (1− δ) Π3 and by assumption psj > pδ > (1− δ) Π3. So,
since Wj (0) < 0, Wj (1) > 0 and Wj is continuous, it follows that Wj (ψl) = 0 has at least
one solution. By symmetry Wl (ψj) = 0 also has at least a solution. This condition is also
sufficient for the existence of a perfect equilibrium: Because of the stationarity of the payoffs
all continuation games that start after a history in which no imitator has entered yet are
isomorphic.
Uniqueness: It is sufficient to show that Wj (ψl) is strictly increasing on [0, 1]. As Wj
and Qj are C
1 functions
W lj ≡ dWj/dψl = (V 2j − V bj )− (δQj − V 1j ) + (1− ψl)δ(dQj/dψl)
Using the definition of Qj, it follows that: W lj = (V 2j −V bj )+V 1j (1−δ)+δ(V 1j −V bj )(2ψl−1).
So a sufficient condition for Wj to be strictly increasing on [0, 1] is: β (1− δ) (1− 2δ) +
δpsj > 0; where this last inequality is derived from our formulas for V
1
j , V
2
j , V
b
j in the main
text and where β ≡ Π2−Π3. Then our maintained assumption in step 1 inf psj = pδ ≡ (1−δ)
43We remind the reader that V 1g is the payoff of the leader, V
2
g of the follower and V
b
g of simultaneous
entry
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can be used to show that the previous inequality is satisfied for all δ ≥ δu. Thus, Wj (ψl) is
strictly increasing on [0, 1]. By symmetry, the same arguments apply to j.
Step 2. As ∆→ 0, the limiting distribution of entry times of each imitator is exponential
with hazard rate λj = r (Π3 − psl) /psl and λl = r (Π3 − psj) /psj.44
For simplicity, we do not index our variables by ∆. We prove the result for l. Note that
Wj(ψl) = 0 can be rearranged as
Wj(ψl) := ajψ2l + bjψl + cj = 0
for aj ≡ δ(V 1j − V bj ) = β(1 − δ) > 0; bj ≡ (V 2j − V bj ) + δ(V bj − V 1j ) + (1 − δ)V 1j > 0 and
cj ≡ −(1− δ)V 1j < 0. The unique candidate solution is
ψ∗l =
−bj +
√
b2j − 4ajcj
2aj
=
(zj − bj)
2aj
=
(zj − bj)
2aj
(zj + bj)
(zj + bj)
At t, conditional on no imitator having entered before, we examine lim∆↓0 [ψ∗l /∆]. Note
that ψ∗l = (γ1/γ2) where γ1 ≡ −2cj and γ2 ≡ zj + bj. As ∆ → 0, aj → 0, bj → psj and
cj → 0. Thus γ1 → 0 and γ2 → 2psj determining that ψ∗l → 0. Thus, by l’Hoˆpital’s rule:
lim∆↓0 [ψ∗l /∆] = lim∆↓0
[
γ′1γ2−γ1γ′2
γ22
]
at ∆ = 0. Because at ∆ = 0: γ′1 = 2r (Π3 − psj) and
γ′2 = −2r (β + psj)
λl := lim
∆↓0
ψ∗l
∆
=
γ′1
γ2
=
r (Π3 − psj)
psj
A distribution has a constant hazard rate iff it is an exponential distribution. Thus, the
cumulative distribution function (cdf) of entry times for l is Gl(t) = 1− e−tλl for t ∈ [0,∞).
Step 3. Recall that p ≡ (psj, psl). Then, the inventor’s expected payoff is
Vs(p) =
rΠ1
(r + λj + λl)
+
(λj + λl) Π3
(r + λj + λl)
+
λjpsj + λlpsl
(r + λj + λl)
Her payoff depends on the time of the first sale, t1 ≡ min {tj, tl}, a random variable that
takes values in [0,∞). Since tj and tl are independent rv with hazard rates λj and λl, t1 has
a hazard rate equal to λj +λl. As the second imitator enters almost instantaneously at time
t1, s obtains: (i) A flow of pi1 up to time t1; (ii) A flow of pi3 from time t1 on; and (iii) At
time t1, she receives either psj or psl depending on the identity of the first imitator. So, for
a given t1: Vs(p; t1) = Π1 [1− e−rt1 ] + e−rt1Π3 + e−rt1( λjλj+λlpsj +
λl
λj+λl
psl).
Since tj and tl are exponentially distributed, t1 is also exponentially distributed with
44Note that as δ → 1 (∆→ 0) the conditions on δ imposed in Step 1 guaranteeing existence and uniqueness
are automatically satisfied.
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parameter λj + λl.
45 Thus, it follows that the inventor’s expected payoff is the expression
reported above.
Step 4. The payoff maximizing knowledge prices are p∗sj = p
∗
sl = κ.
The inventor must choose a pair {psj, psl} to maximize Vs(p). The derivative of Vs(p)
with respect to psj is:
∂Vs
∂psj
≡ V js =
λj
D
− 1
D2
∂λl
∂psj
[pi1 − pi3 − pslr − pslλj + λjpsj]
where D ≡ (r + λj + λl). Using, from step 2, the result for λj, we obtain: V js = λjD −
1
D2
∂λl
∂psj
[pi1 − 2pi3 + λjpsj]. Since ∂λl/∂psj < 0 and pi1 > 2pi3, it follows that V js is strictly
increasing in psj for all psl > 0. By symmetry, V
l
s is strictly increasing in psl for all psj > 0.
So, p∗sj = p
∗
sl = κ.
To conclude: Result(i) is a direct consequence of step 4; Result (ii) is step 2 for the
optimal contract prices p∗sj = p
∗
sl = κ; and finally Result (iii) is step 3 for p
∗
sj = p
∗
sl = κ. 
Proof of Lemma 3. The strategy for the inventor dictates the price of knowledge at
the beginning of each period τ ≥ t+ 1 for every feasible history (i.e., any history for which l
has not entered yet), pτsl : H
τ → [0,∞]. The strategy of l dictates, at each period τ ≥ t+ 1,
whether to enter or not and how to enter, dτl : H
τ × [0,∞] → {il, cl, wl}. Any SPE in pure
strategies must satisfy the following two properties:
P1 (Imitation never occurs). Imitator l enters the market by buying knowledge.
Suppose not and that he were to imitate at period τ ≥ t + 1. Then the inventor would
be strictly better off by selling a contract at any price that imitator l would accept. This
implies that the inventor will never offer a contract at a price strictly higher than κ.
P2 (No Delay). Imitator l buys a contract immediately when it is offered if its price is
equal or smaller than κ.
By P1 l never imitates in equilibrium. When a contract is offered at period τ at a price
smaller or equal than κ he can either accept it or reject it and wait to accept a future offer.
Rejecting a current offer is a best response only if l expects to obtain a higher payoff by
accepting a future offer. However this is clearly impossible: At any time period at which
the contract is sold, its price must be equal to κ. Otherwise s could increase its price and be
strictly better off.
So, we have formally shown that the following pair of strategies constitute the unique
SPE of the bilateral monopoly continuation game: pτsl = κ for all τ ≥ t + 1 at which l has
not entered yet; and dτl = cl iff p
τ
sl ≤ κ for all τ ≥ t + 1 at which l has not entered yet; and
last: dτl = il if p
τ
sl > κ for all τ ≥ t+ 1 at which l has not entered yet. 
45See, for instance, Proposition C.1, page 302, Marshall and Olkin (2007).
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Proof of Proposition 3. A pure strategy for the inventor prescribes to offer, at the
beginning of each period for which no imitator has entered yet, a pair of knowledge prices.
(Only non-transferable contracts are offered). For all t = 0, 1, ..: σt : H t → [0,∞] × [0,∞].
For the imitators, the strategy is a sequence of functions
{
etg
}∞
t=0
for g ∈ {j, l} such that
etg : H
t × [0,∞]× [0,∞]→ {ig, cg, wg}.
Step 1. Any SPE must satisfy the following three properties:
P1 (Imitation never occurs). The imitators enter the market by buying knowledge.
The argument is the same as that of Lemma 2 but with an additional subtlety. No
imitator has an incentive to deviate in this case, although when he deviates and enters by
imitating, competition in the knowledge market follows. The crucial point to notice is that
the no-delay contracting equilibrium of Lemma 1 characterizes the competitive game that
ensues and the imitator who deviates makes zero profit in the knowledge market. Hence, for
any offer such that the fee is less or equal than κ, imitators must enter by buying knowledge.
P2 (Simultaneous Entry). The imitators enter the market at the same time period.
Suppose it were not the case. Then one of them, say j, would enter at period τ ≥ t and
l at period τ̂ > τ . By Lemma 3, in equilibrium, τ̂ = τ + 1 and l’s equilibrium payoff, in
period τ units, would be δ (Π3 − κ). However, by deviating and buying knowledge at period
τ , l’s worst payoff would be (Π3 − κ) which is strictly higher than δ (Π3 − κ).
P3 (No Delay). Whenever the innovator offers contracts at prices smaller or equal than
κ, the offers will be simultaneously accepted by the imitators.
By P1 and P2, in equilibrium, imitation never takes place and entry occurs simultane-
ously. Rejecting any current offer for a price equal or smaller than κ cannot be part of an
equilibrium. The reason is that by rejecting current offers, the imitators postpone their entry
and sacrifice current profits. But then the best offer they can expect from the inventor in
the next period is a contract for a price of κ. Otherwise, the inventor could increase her
price and be strictly better off.
P1, P2 and P3 together imply that, at any time period and for any history at which entry
has not happened yet, the imitators will simultaneously and immediately accept to buy a
contract at a price equal or smaller than κ and they will imitate iff the posted price is higher
than κ. The unique best response of the inventor is to offer, at any time period and for any
history at which a contract has not been bought yet, a pair of contracts at prices equal to κ.
So, in the unique MPE, both imitators enter at period zero and the inventor’s equilibrium
payoff is Π3 + 2κ.
Step 2. In the case of non-transferable contracts the inventor’s payoff is V ns = Π3 + 2κ.
In the case of transferable contracts her payoff is Vs =
pi1
r+2λ
+ 2λ
r+2λ
(Π3 + κ). Let V ≡ Vs−V ns .
Then V > 0 iff: Π1 − Π3 > 2κ(r + λ). Using the expression for λ from Proposition 2 we
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find: V > 0 iff Π1 − 3Π3 > 0. This last inequality is satisfied by Assumption 0. 
Proof of Proposition 4. We prove this proposition in a number of steps. After entry
of any number of imitators, we concentrate on the MPE such that all active players sell
knowledge at a zero price to every inactive imitator. In such an equilibrium, after n ∈ N
imitators enter the market, N − n contracts are sold instantaneously at a zero price to the
remaining N− n imitators. Here, we concentrate on the monopoly subgame.
Step 1. The inventor offers to sell N contracts at a price psN ≤ κN
This step is a generalization of the proof of Lemma 2. It follows the same argument:
No imitator enters by imitating as the inventor would weakly increase his payoff by offering
a contract to that imitator at a price equal to the imitation cost κN. In other words, an
optimal contracting strategy must be inclusive: The inventor must offer to sell knowledge to
the N potential imitators. The implication of this step is that the leader imitator receives
an instantaneous payoff in time t equal to V1 = ΠN+1 − psN.
Step 2. We focus on a symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibrium. Using Step 1we denote by
GN(t, psN) : [0,∞)× [0, κ]→ [0, 1] the distribution function of entry times for the imitators.
We assume momentarily that GN(t, psN) has a density denoted by gN(t, psN). Under this
assumption, ties in the buying times can be safely ignored. Since we focus on a behavioral
equilibrium, if the first sale of knowledge has not happened up to time t, the buyers must
be indifferent between: (i) Buying knowledge at t; and (ii) Waiting dt extra units of time to
buy knowledge at price psN. This indifference condition requires that the opportunity cost
of waiting dt extra units of time (MC) be exactly equal to the expected marginal benefit of
waiting dt extra units of time (EMB).
The MC is the flow of profits that an imitator obtains if he is the leader at time t. Using
Step 1 we have that MC = rV1dt. The MB is the increase in the payoff that an imitator
receives if he is one of the followers rather than the leader. That is MB = (V2 − V1). But
an imitator receives (V2 − V1) iff at least one of the other N− 1 imitators enters first. Since:
(i) We focus on a symmetric equilibrium and: (ii) Randomizations by the imitators are
independent; it follows that: EMB = (N− 1)λN (t, psN) (V2 − V1) where λN (t, psN), the
hazard rate, is defined as: lim∆↓0 Pr(t < tg ≤ t+ ∆|tg ≥ t)/∆ = g (t, psN) / (1−G (t, psN)).
In equilibrium: EMB = (N− 1)λN (t, psN) (V2 − V1) = rV1dt = MC, implying that the
distribution of equilibrium entry times is characterized by a constant hazard rate given by
λN (psN) ≡ λN = rV1
(N− 1) (V2 − V1) =
r (ΠN+1 − psN)
(N− 1) psN
And the cdf for the imitators is G (psN) = 1− e−λN(psN)t : t ∈ [0,∞) (A proof similar to that
of Proposition 2, though longer, is available upon request)
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Step 3. We establish that p∗sN = κN.
Let the time of the first entry be at t1 ∈ [0,∞). Since the follower imitators enter
the market with a zero delay, the inventor obtains: (i) A flow of pi1 up to time t1; (ii) At
time t1, she receives psN; and (iii) A flow of piN+1 from time t1 on. Hence, her payoff is
VsN(psN; t1) = Π1 [1− e−rt1 ] + e−rt1 [psN + ΠN+1]. Since the time of the first entry t1 :=
min {ti, tj, ...tN} has an exponential distribution with parameter equal to NλN, it follows
that her expected payoff is VsN(psN) = µ(λN)Π1 +(1−µ(λN)) [psN + ΠN+1]; where µ(λN) :=
r/ [r + NλN]. Then: ∂VsN(psN)/∂psN = (∂λN/∂psN)(rN/D
2)(psN+ΠN+1−Π1)+(NλN/D);
where D ≡ (r + NλN). Since by Assumption 2: ∀N ≥ 2 : (ΠN+1 − κN) > 0 and psN ≤ κN:
suppsN(psN + ΠN+1−Π1) < 2ΠN+1−Π1 < 0,∀N ≥ 2 by Assumption 0. Last ∂λN/∂psN < 0
ensues that ∂VsN(psN)/∂psN > 0 for all psN ∈ (0, κN] and so p∗sN = κN as stated.
Step 4. It follows directly that
λN =
rV1
(N− 1) (V2 − V1) =
r (ΠN+1 − κN)
(N− 1)κN
and that: VN = µNΠ1 + (1− µN) [κN + ΠN+1] for µN ≡ r/ [r + NλN]. 
Proof of Proposition 5. We know, from Proposition 4, that in equilibrium: VN =
µNΠ1 + (1− µN)(κN + ΠN+1). So: (i) limN→∞(κN + ΠN+1) = 0 by Assumption 2; and (ii)
limN→∞ µN = rr+b−1 ; since:
lim
N→∞
NλN = lim
N→∞
N
[N− 1] limN→∞
r [ΠN+1 − κN]
κN
= b− 1 > 0
because: limN→∞ N[N−1] = 1 and: limN→∞
r[ΠN+1−κN]
κN
= b− 1 by Assumption 3. Then
lim
N→∞
µN =
r
[r + NλN]
=
r
r + b− 1
Thus
lim
N→∞
VN =
r
r + b− 1Π1
and hence when b = 1, it follows that limN→∞ VN = Π1. 
Proof of Proposition 6. We follow a sequence of steps.
Step 1. After one of the imitators, say j, enters at time t, the other must also enter
after a finite length of time by buying knowledge (a contract) at a zero price.
Imitator l must necessarily enter after some finite length of time because by imitating
instantaneously at t he guarantees himself a payoff in time t units equal to Vl = Π3− κ > 0.
Imitation, however, cannot occur in a SPE. To see this, suppose that imitation would take
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place in a SPE at time t+ τ for a finite τ ≥ 0. Then one of the sellers (j or s) would deviate
and offer a contract at a price equal to κ that would be accepted by l. This deviation would
be payoff profitable since: (i) It would increases the contracting revenues of the seller from
zero to a strictly positive amount; and: (ii) It would not affect the present value of the market
profits of the deviant seller because entry were going to happen at time t+ τ anyway. Last,
observe that in any SPE, knowledge is sold to the second buyer (i.e., the second contract)
at a zero price and both sellers must offer it at a zero price. To see this, suppose that the
second contract were sold at time t+ τ at a strictly positive price. Then one or maybe both
sellers would make strictly positive expected profits. But then at least one of them might
decrease the price and increase his contracting revenues without affecting the present value
of his or her market profits. So when a contract is sold it must be sold at a zero price.
Step 2. For any d2 ∈
[
0, d2
]
there exists at least a SPE in pure strategies whose outcome
is for l to enter the market at time t2 = t+d2 by buying a contract at a zero price iff 2Π3 ≤ Π2.
This step will prove both Results (i) and (ii). We show that the following strategies
support the SPE outcomes described above. However, note that these strategies are not
unique: They were chosen because of their simplicity. What remains unique is the equilibrium
outcome delivered by these strategies.
The sellers (j and s) use the following symmetric pricing strategy: pl =∞,∀τ < t2 and
pl = 0,∀τ ≥ t2. We now define the buyer’s strategy. Let m = j, s be the seller who offers
the minimal price and pm ≡ minm∈{j,s} pm.
dl =

clr if pm < Π3
[
1− e−r(t2−t)] ,∀τ < t2
wl if pm ≥ Π3
[
1− e−r(t2−t)] ,∀τ < t2
clr if pm ≤ min [κ, (1− δ)Π3] ,∀τ ≥ t2
il if κ ≤ min [pm, (1− δ)Π3] ,∀τ ≥ t2
wl if min [pm, κ] > (1− δ)Π3,∀τ ≥ t2
We show that for any d2 ∈
[
0, d2
]
these strategies form a SPE and give rise to the equilibrium
outcomes described in result (ii). First: The decision function of the buyer and the pricing
function of the sellers for τ ≥ t2 are exactly the same as those of Lemma 1 and hence they
constitute mutual best responses. We now show that these strategies are also best responses
for τ < t2. By definition of d2, l does not have any incentive to deviate and imitate at any
τ < t2. Suppose that one of the sellers deviates and proposes a price p∗ at time τ < t2. If l
accepts the offer, he obtains a payoff at time τ equal to Π3 − p∗. By rejecting it, l expects a
payoff of e−r(t2−τ)Π3. He therefore accepts the offer iff p∗ ≤ Π3
[
1− e−r(t2−τ)] as prescribed
by the above strategy.
Consider the pricing strategy of the sellers. Let t2 = t+ d2. For d2 = 0 we have already
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constructed in Lemma 1 the unique MPE. Let d2 be such that 0 < d2 ≤ d2. Then for
a seller, say j, the best deviation at time τ < t2 is to offer a contract at a price equal
to υ where υ = Π3
[
1− e−r(t2−τ)]. The seller will not find such a deviation profitable if
Π3 + υ ≤ Π2
[
1− e−r(t2−τ)]+ e−r(t2τ)Π3. That is if 2Π3 ≤ Π2. We have therefore shown the
second part of the proposition.
To show uniqueness, suppose that 2Π3 > Π2 and that the second contract is sold at
time t2 > t. According to Step 1, the equilibrium price must be zero. Besides we know
that for any τ ∈ [t, t2) imitator l will accept to pay at most υ for the second contract. But
because 2Π3 > Π2 offering a contract at a price υ is a profitable deviation for the sellers (see
discussion in previous paragraph). Because our argument is valid for any value of t2 > t it
follows that the unique SPE outcome, when 2Π3 > Π2, corresponds to that of the no-delay
equilibrium. 
Proof of Proposition 7. Time is continuous: t ∈ [0,∞). We denote by G(t, ps) :
[0,∞) → [0, 1] the distribution function of entry times for the imitators. We assume mo-
mentarily that G(t, ps) has a density denoted by g(t, ps). Under these assumptions ties in
the buying times can be safely ignored. To simplify, we also suppose that the inventor does
not price discriminate between the imitators. The proof follows a number of steps.
Step 1. If d2 < d˜2 = r
−1 ln(Π2/(Π2−κ)), the distribution of entry times of each imitator
is exponential with hazard rate equal to λ(ps) = r [(Π3 − ps) + α2 (Π2 − Π3)] / [ps − α2Π2].
Notice that now the payoff to the leader imitator is V1 = α2Π2 + (1− α2) Π3 − ps and
to the follower is V2 = (1− α2) Π3; where α2 ≡ (1 − e−rd2). Hence V2 > V1 iff α2Π2 < ps.
(Note that α2Π2 < κ when d2 < d˜2). We will show in Step 2 that the optimal price chosen
by the inventor is κ and thus the condition above is satisfied. For the moment, we assume
that V2 > V1 when d2 < d˜2.
As we focus on a behavioral equilibrium, at time t, if entry has not happened yet, imitators
must be indifferent between: (i) Buying knowledge at t; and (ii) Waiting dt extra units of
time before buying it. This condition requires that the opportunity cost of waiting dt extra
units of time be exactly equal to the expected marginal benefit of waiting dt extra units of
time. The opportunity cost is MC = rV1dt. The marginal benefit is MB(dt) = V2 − V1.
However, the marginal benefit is only received if the rival imitator enters first: an event
that is determined by the hazard rate λ (t, ps) ≡ (g(t, ps)/1−G(t, ps)). So, in a SPE it
must be that λ (t, ps) (V2 − V1) = rV1dt. Thus for any d2 < d˜2 equilibrium entry times are
characterized by a constant hazard rate (and thus by an exponential distribution) given by
λ(ps) = r [(Π3 − ps) + α2 (Π2 − Π3)] / [ps − α2Π2].
Step 2. The optimal knowledge price is p∗s = κ.
Like in the proof of Proposition 2, assume that the time of the first sale occurred at
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t1 ∈ [0,∞). Since now the follower imitator buys knowledge (i.e., the second contract)
with a delay equal to d2 (i.e., enters at time t2), the innovator obtains: (i) A flow of pi1
up to time t1; (ii) At time t1, she receives ps; (iii) A flow of pi2 from time t1 up to t2;
and last: (iv) A flow of pi3 from t2 on. Hence, her payoff is Vs(t, ps, d2) = Π1 [1− e−rt1 ] +
e−rt1 [ps + α2Π2 + (1− α2) Π3]. Because the time of the first sale t1 := min {tl, tj} has an
exponential distribution with parameter 2λ it follows that her expected payoff is Vs(ps, d2) =
µ(λ(ps))Π1 + (1−µ(λ(ps))) [ps + α2Π2 + (1− α2) Π3]; where µ(λ(ps)) := r/ (r + 2λ(ps)). To
conclude this step it suffices to show that the optimal price chosen by the inventor is equal
to κ. To accomplish this, observe that the inventor chooses ps to maxVs(p, dτ ) subject to
the hazard rate found in Step 1. Thus: ∂Vs(p, d2)/∂ps = − (2r/D2) (∂λ(ps)/∂ps) (Π1 −M)+
(2λ(ps)/D); whereD ≡ r+2λ(ps) andM≡ [ps + Π2 − α2 (Π2 − Π3)]. Since: (i) ∂λ(ps)/∂ps <
0; (ii) arg minps∈(0,κ](Π1−M) = κ; and (iii) The least upper bound of κ is Π3, it is evident that
infκ (Π1 −M) = Π1−Π3 + Π2 +α2 (Π2 − Π3) > 0. So, because ∂Vs(p, d2)/∂ps > 0∀ps > 0, s
chooses p∗s = κ and her equilibrium payoff is obtained by replacing p
∗
s into Vs(ps; d2). Steps
1 and 2 prove result (i) of Proposition 7.
To prove result (ii) note that for preemption games the limiting distribution of discrete-
time games (as ∆ goes to zero) may not usually be expressed as an equilibrium in continuous
time strategies of the kind used in Step 1. Because of this limitation, we use our discrete
time model and then we compute the limiting distribution of the equilibrium outcomes (See,
for example, Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)).
Step 3. We obtain for our discrete time model the unique symmetric SPE in behavior
strategies.
The equilibrium condition is W (ψ) = ψ [V2 − Vb] + (1−ψ) [δQ(ψ)− V1] = 0, for Q(ψ) =
ψVb + (1− ψ)V1. This quadratic equation has two roots: ψ =
(−b±√b2 − 4ac) /2a; where
a := δ (V1 − Vb) > 0; b := (V2 − δV1) + (1 − δ)) (V1 − Vb); and c := −(1 − δ)V1 < 0.
Since δ depends on ∆, it follows that as ∆ → 0, ψ → (V1 − V2) ± (V2 − V1) / [2 (V1 − Vb)].
We consider the solution corresponding to the positive root ψ = (V1 − V2) / (V1 − Vb). By
definition of V1, V2 and given that Vb = Π3−ps we have that ψ = (α2Π2 − ps) /α2 (Π2 − Π3).
Note that ψ ≤ 1 iff V2 > Vb. Since we consider d˜2 ≤ d2 ≤ d2, it follows that V2 > Vb iff ps
satisfies κ (Π3/Π2) < ps ≤ κ. Thus, at each period, each imitator plans to enter the market
by buying knowledge with probability ψ conditional on not having entered before.
Step 4. Assuming that V2 > Vb, we establish the limiting distribution of entry times as
∆→ 0 and show that p∗s = κ.
Fix any real time t > 0 and observe that the probability that no imitator will have bought
a contract by time t is approximately equal to (1 − ψ)n(t,∆) where n(t,∆) ≡ (2t) /∆ is the
number of decision nodes between time 0 and time t when the real time length of a period is
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∆. As ∆ goes to zero, n(t,∆) increases without bound and hence this probability converges
to zero. The conclusion is that at least an imitator will buy a contract and enter the market
for sure at time t = 0. Next, we obtain the probability of simultaneous entry at t = 0. For
that, consider that we must compute the probability of simultaneous entry conditional on
the information that the event ‘no imitator enters the market at t = 0’ has zero probability.
Because both imitators entering simultaneously has probability ψ2, we can conclude that
the probability of simultaneous entry at t = 0 is φ (ps, d2) = ψ/ (2− ψ) and therefore the
inventor’s expected payoff is
Vs(p, d2) = φ (ps, d2) [2ps + Π3] + [1− φ (ps, d2)] [ps + α2Π2 + (1− α2) Π3]
Observe that ∂Vs(p,d2)
∂ps
= (∂φ/∂ps)ω (ps, d2) + (1 + φ), where ω (ps, d2) := [ps − α2 (Π2 − Π3)].
We can then show that: ∂φ/∂ps = 2 (2− ψ)−2 [∂ψ (ps, d2) /∂ps]; where ∂ψ (ps, d2) /∂ps =
−1/α2 (Π2 − Π3) and (1 + φ) = 2/ (2− ψ). Straightforward mathematical manipulations
show that: ∂Vs(ps, d2)/∂ps > 0 iff −ω (ps, d2) /α2 (Π2 − Π3) + (2− ψ) > 0. And after re-
placing ψ and ω (ps, d2) by their values, we finally obtain that: ∂Vs(ps, d2)/∂ps > 0 iff
2α2 (Π2 − Π3)− α2Π3 > 0. Since by Assumption 0: 2Π2 > 3Π3 : ∂Vs(ps, d2)/∂ps > 0 for all
κ (Π3/Π2) < ps ≤ κ and the optimal price is p∗s = κ validating our assumption that V2 > Vb.
The equilibrium payoff for the inventor is directly computed by replacing p∗s in Vs(ps, d2).
Thus Steps 3 and 4 complete the proof of Proposition 7. 
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